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ERROR COSTS & IP LAW 
Joseph Scott Miller* 
A court in doubt about an IP statute’s scope can err in two ways.  
It can wrongly narrow the IP right’s reach, or wrongly broaden it.  
The latter error, however, is worse: A wrongly broadened IP statute 
effectively creates new property and thereby diminishes the public 
domain and others’ freedom of action.  To correct erroneous broad-
ening, unlike erroneous narrowing, the legislature must thus eliminate 
a now-established property right.  And that is very hard to do.  Courts 
cannot, of course, avoid making at least some mistakes.  Courts can, 
however, prefer the mistakes that are easier, not harder, for the legis-
lature to correct.  This Essay explores this error-cost-based approach 
to IP statutes.  The time is ripe for more effective interbranch dialogue 
on IP law, for the America Invents Act of 2011—comprising some of 
the most significant changes to patent law since the 1952 Patent Act—
came fully into force in March 2013. 
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In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our 
course, we must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights 
created by a legislative enactment which never contemplated such a 
calculus of interests. 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.1 
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to Diane Amann, Susan Davies, Graeme Dinwoodie, Rebecca Eisenberg, Paul Gugliuzza, Paul Heald, 
Hillel Levin, Jessica Litman, Bill McGeveran, Rob Merges, Jim Speta, Connie Trela, and Christian 
Turner, as well as participants in both the Fall 2012 University of Michigan Law School IP Colloquium 
and the Spring 2013 Oxford University IP Invited Speaker Seminar Series. 
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Legislatures, with far more comprehensive responsibilities than any 
other official institution, are unlikely to stop to listen to demands 
for a change in the law unless it is plain that such a change is need-
ed.  This is unlikely to be plain unless a court has spoken. 
Hart & Sacks2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine: A U.S. court, state or federal, confronts a new question 
about the substantive scope or application of an intellectual property 
(“IP”) statute.  The court genuinely doubts which of the plausible an-
swers better carries out the statute’s command.  What role should the 
court’s doubt play in how it answers the question?  Should the court can-
didly describe that role in the opinion explaining its judgment? 
This question of judicial doubt about a legislative directive is at bot-
tom a cross-branch question about error correction.  And “the under-
standing of what a choice is about is of great importance to the making of 
a choice.”3  To cut to the chase: A court in doubt about the scope of an 
entitlement that an IP statute creates should choose the narrower scope 
for the IP right because that error—if error it be—is the easier one for a 
legislature to correct by subsequent amendment.  The opposing error, 
providing a broader scope for the entitlement, effectively expands a 
property right at the expense of others’ free action in the public domain; 
and such an expansion, when in error, is much harder for a legislature to 
undo.4  Nor can courts simply ignore any IP-right-broadening error as 
harmless; they know that this excessive propertization can harm innova-
tion just as readily as its opposite.5  In addition, it is vital for the court, 
 
 1. 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984); see also id. at 430–31 (“Repeatedly, as new developments have oc-
curred in this country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned the new rules that new technology 
made necessary.”). 
 2. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 163 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) 
(prepared for publication from 1958 Tentative Edition). 
 3. Gillian K. Hadfield, Changing the Path of the Law, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS 
INFLUENCE 278, 283 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000). 
 4. Court correction of the error in a subsequent case is unlikely: U.S. courts apply stare decisis 
most vigorously in statutory cases.  See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 
(2008) (“Further, stare decisis in respect to statutory interpretation has ‘special force,’ for ‘Congress 
remains free to alter what we have done.’”) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 
172–173 (1989)); Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172–73 (1989) (“[T]he burden borne by the party advocating 
the abandonment of an established precedent is greater where the Court is asked to overrule a point 
of statutory construction.  Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory 
interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is 
implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.”); see also EDWARD H. LEVI, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 32–33 (1949); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory 
Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988); Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for 
an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 181–82 (1989).  It is, for the most 
part, legislative correction or bust. 
 5. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012) 
(“[E]ven though rewarding with patents those who discover new laws of nature and the like might well 
encourage their discovery, those laws and principles, considered generally, are ‘the basic tools of scien-
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having applied the statute more modestly, to explain both the particular 
basis for its doubt about the statutory text and its error-cost rationale for 
confining the right’s reach.  Such candor helps the legislature, and the in-
terested public more generally, both to identify the possible need for a 
corrective amendment and to craft new statutory text that addresses the 
doubtful scope that the case, helpfully, exposed.  Improving interbranch 
dialogue to produce better tailored IP laws is fitting, given that 
“[l]egislatures and courts are cooperative law-making bodies.”6 
Most IP law is now statutory.7  This Essay explores the foregoing er-
ror-cost approach by which to resolve especially challenging cases that 
turn on an IP statute’s substantive scope.  To focus discussion, I take as a 
given that legislatures make the primary choices of legal policy,8 includ-
 
tific and technological work.’  And so there is a danger that the grant of patents that tie up their use 
will inhibit future innovation premised upon them . . . .”) (internal citation omitted) (quoting 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) 
(“And as progress beginning from higher levels of achievement is expected in the normal course, the 
results of ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws.  Were it 
otherwise patents might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts.”); Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005) (“The more artistic protection is favored, 
the more technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration of copyright law is an exer-
cise in managing the tradeoff.”). 
 6. LEVI, supra note 4, at 32; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Under-
standings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 992 
(2001) (concluding that “Article III judges interpreting statutes are both agents carrying our directives 
laid down by the legislature and partners in the enterprise of law elaboration, for they (like the legisla-
ture) are ultimately agents of ‘We the People’”) (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.); Robert A. Katzmann, 
Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 645–46 (2012) (“When a court interprets a statute, it articulates the 
meaning of the words of the legislative branch. . . . Although in a formal sense the legislative process 
ends with legislative enactment of a law, in their interpretative role courts inescapably become partici-
pants in that process.”). 
 7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. b (1995) (“Achieving a 
proper balance between protection and access is often a complicated and difficult undertaking.  Be-
cause of the complexity and indeterminacy of the competing interests, rights in intangible trade values 
such as ideas, innovations, and information have been created primarily through legislation.”).  Of 
course, even in these heavily codified areas, courts continue to play a partnership role with legisla-
tures—both because legislatures often frame IP statutes with open-textured language, and because the 
statutes are framed and construed against a rich common-law backdrop.  See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Le-
land Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2198–99 (2011) (“It would be 
noteworthy enough for Congress to supplant one of the fundamental precepts of patent law and de-
prive inventors of rights in their own inventions.  To do so under such unusual terms would be truly 
surprising.  We are confident that if Congress had intended such a sea change in intellectual property 
rights it would have said so clearly—not obliquely through an ambiguous definition of ‘subject inven-
tion’ and an idiosyncratic use of the word ‘retain.’”); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 
U.S. 730, 739–41 (1989) (construing the Copyright Act’s definition of “work made for hire,” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101, which uses the terms “employee” and “employment,” according to common-law principles of 
agency, given the absence of any special definition for “employee” in the Act); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, 
The Common Law and Trade Marks in an Age of Statutes, in THE COMMON LAW OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 331, 333 (Catherine W. Ng et al. eds., 2010) (noting trademark law’s mix of “substantial 
legislative intervention” and “heav[y] dependen[ce] on common law law-making by the courts”). 
 8. See RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 9 (2012) (“The legislature is the 
pre-eminent lawmaking body in any good polity, as well as the central political institution, the deliber-
ation and action of which is the focus of democratic political life.”); HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 
1374 (concluding that a court construing a statute should “[r]espect the position of the legislature as 
the chief policy-determining agency of the society, subject only to the limitations of the constitution 
under which it exercises its powers”); James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political 
Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2010) (“[O]ur separation-of-powers under-
standing [is] that in the statutory domain, federal courts are expected to act as agents of the politically 
MILLER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/2014  3:40 PM 
178 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2014 
ing decisions about what counts as property and what does not.  I also 
take as a given that courts play a unique role in identifying the fuzzy 
boundaries that IP statutes, like all statutes, are certain to have, as they 
resolve particular parties’ specific disputes about a statute’s meaning.9  
(Legislatures cannot draft comprehensively for all current, much less all 
future, contingencies.10)  As a result, both legislatures and courts are nec-
essarily involved in the effective framing, application, and maintenance 
of our IP laws.  Common sense suggests that a dialogue that respects and 
leverages their complementary institutional capacities is better than the 
alternative.11  Courts can surely contribute to this dialogue by describing 
plainly their doubts about a murky bit of code that a case reveals, and 
opting for the reading that, should it prove incorrect by the legislature’s 
lights, is the easier error for the legislature to correct. 
The error-cost, or “decision theory,”12 approach may at first appear 
strange in the IP context, but it should be familiar from the adjacent 
branch of the market-structuring legal order—namely, antitrust law.13  In 
antitrust, the Supreme Court has openly shaped doctrine, implementing 
quite broadly worded statutes, by carefully considering the relative costs 
of errors and administration that a given doctrine might embody.14  As I 
describe below, error-cost analysis plays out differently in the IP branch 
than in the antitrust branch, but the overall advantages for sound legal 
development are the same.  Rumblings of an error-cost approach to con-
 
accountable branches.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 405, 437 (1989) (“[W]here there is neither interpretive doubt nor constitutional objection, the 
judgment of the electorally accountable branch should prevail.”). 
 9. However clear a statute may be in its core applications, litigation about the statute comes to 
focus on uncertainties in its boundaries: “[T]he cases that come to a court are predominantly and dis-
proportionately ones that are in some way hard.”  FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 
13 n.1 (2009); see also id. at 20, 22–23, 137 (explaining how litigated cases skew toward those where 
both sides have good legal arguments in their respective favors). 
 10. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF 
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 32–37 (Tony Honoré & Joseph Raz eds., 1991); 
Andrew Morrison Stumpff, The Law is a Fractal: The Attempt to Anticipate Everything, 44 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 649, 650–53 (2013).  The problem is inherent in any effort to fit words to real-world events, 
not merely in legislating.  Indeed, Judge Posner makes a point about privately created duties similar to 
Prof. Stumpff’s point about publicly created duties.  See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics 
of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2005) (observing that “contracts regulate the 
future, and [thus] interpretive problems are bound to arise simply because the future is unpredictable. 
Stated otherwise, perfect foresight is infinitely costly . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
 11. See Katzmann, supra note 6, at 646 (highlighting “practical ways in which Congress may bet-
ter signal its meaning, and how courts may better inform Congress of problems they perceive in the 
statutes they review”). 
 12. See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 83 (2010) 
(defining “decision theory” as “the branch of microeconomics concerned with optimal choice in the 
presence of uncertainty”).  “As applied to the formulation of legal rules, ‘decision theory’ considers 
the likely incidence and costs associated with false convictions (false positives) and false acquittals 
(false negatives)—collectively, error costs—as well as the costs of administering any particular rule.”  
Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in 
Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 735 n.11 (2012). 
 13. See Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 
51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 906 (2010) (“Identifying the appropriate scope of IP protection is as much a ques-
tion of competition policy as of patent or copyright policy.”). 
 14. See generally Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 871 (2011). 
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struing IP statutes are faint in the Supreme Court’s cases, but they do ex-
ist.  In recent IP jurisprudence, they come primarily from Justice John 
Paul Stevens, the Court’s leading antitrust-law figure15 at the time of his 
2009 retirement.16  (I do not think it is a coincidence that Justice Stevens 
has used a familiar antitrust move in his IP opinions,17 even if he has, on 
occasion, been critical of the move in antitrust itself.18)  Some IP scholars 
have applied decision theory’s insights to explain the shape of trademark 
doctrine,19 and others to explain features of trade secret law,20 but none 
has discussed the asymmetry—for relative ease of legislative correction—
that separates broadening and trimming errors in the construction of IP 
statutes generally. 
The time is ripe to consider a decision-theoretic approach to the 
way judges respond to uncertainty about an IP statute’s boundary.  The 
approach situates the judicial response in its broader institutional con-
text, and in a way that can foster more productive interbranch dialogue.21  
Indeed, “this framework offers great explanatory and normative force as 
an evaluative tool.”22  The IP literature has taken an institutional turn, of 
late, and this Essay expands the menu of approaches.23  Judges and advo-
cates need as many helpful tools for navigating murky IP statutes as 
scholars can provide, especially now that the America Invents Act of 
 
 15. See Spencer Weber Waller, Justice Stevens and the Rule of Reason, 62 SMU L. REV. 693, 695, 
697–700 (2009) (describing Justice Stevens’ extensive background experience with antitrust law prior 
to his arrival at the Supreme Court). 
 16. John Paul Stevens, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT ITT CHICAGO-KENT C. OF L., http://www.oyez. 
org/justices/john_paul_stevens (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
 17. See Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property Leg-
acy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831, 1832 (2006) (“Perhaps owing to his background as 
an antitrust lawyer, Justice Stevens views IP law as a limited statutory monopoly that must serve the 
public interest.  He is skeptical of efforts by rights holders to extend their monopolies beyond the 
bounds set by the legislature.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 1840 (“When Congress has not clearly ex-
pressed its intent to extend protection as far as a plaintiff would like, Justice Stevens tends to construe 
the monopoly right narrowly because of the impacts that broad rulings will have on competition, 
commerce, and public access to knowledge.”). 
 18. See Lambert, supra note 14, at 929 (discussing Justice Stevens’ concurrence-in-the-judgment 
in Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007)). 
 19. See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2123 
n.73 (2004); William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267, 2279 
(2010). 
 20. See LYDIA PALLAS LOREN & JOSEPH SCOTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: 
CASES & MATERIALS 27–28 (3d ed. 2012); Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (2007). 
 21. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 
2165 (2002) (arguing that “judges can and should still serve as honest agents for a democratic polity by 
responding to unclear legislative instructions with the use of statutory default rules that maximize the 
extent to which statutory results accurately reflect enactable political preferences,” and that “when 
enactable preferences are unclear, often the best choice is instead a preference-eliciting default rule 
that is more likely to provoke a legislative reaction that resolves the statutory indeterminacy and thus 
creates an ultimate statutory result that reflects enactable political preferences more accurately than 
any judicial estimate possibly could”). 
 22. McGeveran, supra note 19, at 2279. 
 23. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, IP Injury and the Institutions of Patent Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 
747, 749–50 & n.18 (2013) (collecting sources reflecting an institutional approach to patent law).  Cop-
yright scholars frequently deploy public choice theory, more or less formally, to analyze the contours 
of IP doctrine.  See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 14 (2001).  
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2011 (“AIA”) has come fully into force as of March 2013.24  This sweep-
ing set of amendments to the Patent Act of 1952 “completes a 30-year 
journey to remake, in their entirety, each of the foundational assump-
tions underlying the operation of the U.S. patent system.”25  It is bound 
to confront courts with uncertain boundaries that only particular disputes 
will reveal. 
The plan of the Essay is to lay out an error-cost approach to fixing 
an IP statute’s boundary in a case of doubt (Part II), next to consider the 
inchoate support for an error-cost approach that past IP cases offer (Part 
III), and then to examine the well-established support for error-cost 
analysis that antitrust doctrine provides (Part IV).  Part V briefly con-
cludes. 
II. ERROR COSTS AND IP STATUTES 
Among the provisions in the AIA is a new exclusion from patent 
protection.  It states as follows: “Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human 
organism.”26  The example shows that Congress defines an IP right’s net 
scope by both affirmative provision and by defenses and exclusions.  
How far does this AIA exclusion reach?  It would be easier to answer if 
the statute prohibited merely a patent claim directed to a human organ-
ism; the phrase “directed to,” which is common parlance for patent prac-
titioners, indicates a patent claim that recites the subject matter in ques-
tion.27  But the statute also prohibits claims encompassing a human 
organism.  How do such patent claims differ as a group, if at all, from 
claims directed to a human organism?  Should a claim that recites a 
method for preserving frozen human embryos be held to encompass a 
human organism, i.e., to fall outside the reach of patentable subject mat-
ter?  The statutory text’s boundary is unclear.  There is legislative history 
on the provision,28 but it is not especially illuminating for this hypothet-
 
 24. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (defining the 
effective dates of various subsections of the act, ranging from immediately to eighteen months from 
the enactment date).  The AIA’s general effective date was September 16, 2012.  See id. § 35, 125 Stat. 
at 341.  The Act provided numerous exceptions to this general date, however, and the effective date 
for the changes that move U.S. patent law from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file system was March 16, 
2013.  See id. § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293. 
 25. Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Implications for Patent-
ing, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4 (2012).  Specifically, “[i]t adopted the first-to-file system of determining a pa-
tent’s priority date, redefined what constitutes prior art against a patent, created several new post-
issuance proceedings for patents and revised existing proceedings, and made many other important 
changes to the patent code.”  Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: 
Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 435 (2012).  Indeed, “it arguably makes the most substantial changes 
to the law since those imposed by the Patent Act of 1836 . . . , which created the system of patent ex-
amination.” Id. 
 26. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 33(a), 125 Stat. at 340. 
 27. See, e.g., Brilliant Instruments, Inc. v. GuideTech, LLC, 707 F.3d 1342, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(“The ‘671 and ‘649 patent claims are directed to internal circuitry of a measurement circuit.”).  Ex-
amples are legion.  In Westlaw’s CTAF database of Federal Circuit opinions, in a search conducted 
April 7, 2013, the query “claim! /3 ‘directed to’” returned 1,163 hits. 
 28. See Matal, supra note 25, at 510–11 (discussing section thirty-three of the AIA). 
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ical claim.  The point is not earthshattering, or even unfamiliar.  Such 
fuzzy boundaries crop up in statutes all the time.29 
What should a court confronted with the putative frozen-human-
embryo-preservation-method claim do?  Strike down the claim based on 
a broad reading of the statutory exclusion, and it may be an error—
specifically, a false negative.  Uphold the claim based on a narrow read-
ing of the statutory exclusion, and, again, it may be an error—this time, a 
false positive.  How can one corral these possibilities?  Forty years ago, 
then-Professor Richard Posner suggested a decision-theoretic approach 
to organizing and weighing the relevant options: 
The purpose of legal procedure is conceived to be the minimization 
of the sum of two types of costs: “error costs” (the social costs gen-
erated when a judicial system fails to carry out the allocative or oth-
er social functions assigned to it), and the “direct costs” (such as 
lawyers’, judges’, and litigants’ time) of operating the legal dispute-
resolution machinery.30 
What he called “direct costs” are now usually called “administrative 
costs,”31 but the same basic approach has become a fixture of legal analy-
sis.32 
How does one minimize the sum of the administrative and error 
costs of determining a statutory IP right’s scope?  Answering the statuto-
ry construction question in the case—what is the right’s substantive 
scope?—has a given level of administrative costs.  These costs derive 
from the conventional methods of statutory construction, which look to 
text, context, purpose, precedent, and consequence.33  The costs affect 
 
 29. My example is simply a variation on the Hart/Fuller Debate’s famed “no vehicles in the 
park” problem.  See generally Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1109 (2008).  Here, it is “no humans in the patent claim.” For another pointer to this patch of the 
AIA, see Dan L. Burk, Patent Reform in the United States: Lessons Learned, REG.,  Winter 2012–13, at 
20, 24. 
 30. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 399–400 (1973). 
 31. See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 19, at 2279 (“Decision theory suggests that in all subject 
areas, two types of costs are associated with the structure of legal doctrine: administrative costs (also 
sometimes called legal process costs or information costs) and error costs.”). 
 32. Id. (“Many legal scholars have borrowed a ‘decision theory’ model from economists to eval-
uate the optimal form of legal commands.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1358 (2013) (“In our view, 
[Copyright Act] § 109(a)’s language, its context, and the common-law history of the ‘first sale’ doc-
trine, taken together, favor a non-geographical interpretation.  We also doubt that Congress would 
have intended to create the practical copyright-related harms with which a geographical interpretation 
would threaten ordinary scholarly, artistic, commercial, and consumer activities.  We consequently 
conclude that Kirtsaeng’s nongeographical reading is the better reading of the Act.”) (citation omit-
ted); Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735, 741 (2013) (construing the definition of “vessel” 
in 1 U.S.C. § 3, and concluding that its “view of the statute is consistent with its text, precedent, and 
relevant purposes”).  The literature on statutory construction methods features its share of pitched 
battles.  There is, however, widespread agreement about the principal sources and methods for statu-
tory construction, both among judges and commentators.  The continuing debates are intense, but they 
are closer to the fringe than the core, or touch on variations of emphasis. Compare Jonathan T. Molot, 
The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (“On one hand, textualism has so 
succeeded in discrediting strong purposivism that it has led even nonadherents to give great weight to 
statutory text.  On the other hand, textualists have been so successful in updating their own philoso-
phy, and in distinguishing modern textualism from the old ‘plain meaning’ school, that textualists 
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both litigants (who must gather and synthesize the necessary infor-
mation) and judges (who must process it to a conclusion).  And, at any 
given level of administrative cost, some errors are bound to remain.  One 
could focus on the tradeoff between administrative and error costs—
which are generally inversely proportional34—by exploring different stat-
utory construction strategies.  That is not my focus here. 
Consider, instead, the error-cost term in the sum we seek to mini-
mize.  Two insights are critical here.  First, there is no reason—with one 
exception—to expect false positives to outnumber false negatives, or vice 
versa, purely on the basis of one’s chosen approach to statutory construc-
tion.35  For example, reliance on dictionaries or semantic canons to con-
strue a disputed word or phrase, or on other portions of the IP statute 
under review for context, or on its legislative history for insight about the 
statute’s purpose, will not systematically make a false positive less likely 
at the same time it leaves the likelihood of a false negative unchanged 
(or worse, increased).  The point is important, because cost minimization 
should take account of the relative frequencies of errors, as well as their 
magnitude.36  Here, the errors occur equally frequently, so far as a given 
set of statutory construction sources and methods is concerned. 
Second, false positives (erroneous grants of an IP entitlement) are 
systematically more costly than false negatives (erroneous denials of an 
IP entitlement).  Specifically, false positives are more costly to correct 
through legislative amendment than are false negatives.  The reasons for 
the differential are both formal and practical.  The common thread con-
necting the reasons is that, unlike false negatives, false positives generate 
property rights.  I consider these differential costs of error correction in 
more detail, before discussing some likely objections. 
 
themselves will consider a statute’s context as well as its text.  Given that nonadherents and adherents 
of textualism alike place great weight on statutory text and look beyond text to context, it is hard to 
tell what remains of the textualism-purposivism debate.”) (footnote omitted), with John F. Manning, 
What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 75 (2006) (“[B]ecause modern 
textualists understand that the meaning of statutory language (like all language) depends wholly on 
context, their asserted distinction between enacted text and unenacted intentions or purposes is 
somewhat imprecise.  In any case posing a meaningful interpretive question, the very process of ascer-
taining textual meaning inescapably entails resorting to extrastatutory—and thus unenacted—
contextual cues.”). 
 34. McGeveran, supra note 19, at 2280. 
 35. The exception is the Supreme Court’s use of a clear statement rule that disfavors giving the 
Patent Act extraterritorial effect.  See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007) 
(“The presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world applies 
with particular force in patent law.”); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531–32 
(1972) (applying the rule).  Policy canons such as this “put thumbs on the scale in favor of certain sub-
stantive policies.”  CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 82 (2011).  This clear statement 
rule pushes the Patent Act cases it governs in favor of false negatives—the same direction, I argue, 
that should apply generally to IP statutes of doubtful scope.  The approach I explain here, then, sub-
sumes the presumption against extraterritorial effects for doubtful Patent Act provisions. 
 36. McGeveran, supra note 19, at 2280; see also Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 12, at 97–98 (ex-
plaining the importance of accounting for an error’s frequency as well as its magnitude when estimat-
ing the error’s total social cost). 
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A. The Higher Costs of Correcting False Positives 
The formal cost driver when correcting a false positive legislatively 
is the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on uncompensated takings of pri-
vate property.37  A legislature can, of course, amend an IP statute to nar-
row rights without raising a takings issue if the amendment applies pure-
ly prospectively.38  But that prospective change leaves in place a group of 
IP rights that, so far as the legislature is concerned, ought never to have 
existed.  To fully correct that mistake, the legislation would need to apply 
retroactively, either extinguishing the IP grants outright or—what 
amounts to the same thing—declaring them unenforceable against any 
and all parties.39  Legislation could achieve partial correction if it applied 
retroactively and trimmed some, but not all, of the IP owner’s rights.40 
Canceling a property right, in whole or in part, raises a formal legal 
concern about takings.  With respect to the total abrogation of an IP 
right, in particular, there is no Supreme Court case that answers the 
question definitively.41  There is, however, reason to think that such an 
outright legislative cancellation of an existing group of IP rights could 
constitute an unconstitutional taking if the cancellation were not com-
pensated.42  One can analogize the cancellation to cases in which the 
 
 37. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”).  “Th[is] Clause is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.”  
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 n.1 (2005). 
 38. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(4) (2006) (limiting a newly created infringement defense so that 
it applies purely prospectively to patents maturing from applications filed after its enactment). 
 39. Corrective legislation, completely and fully to eliminate the mistake, should arguably include 
a one-shot repayment to the defendant(s) who lost against the assertion of the improvidently recog-
nized right (covering attorney fees, damages paid, etc.). 
 40. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 273 (providing a tightly confined “prior user” defense to patent in-
fringement).  For the Supreme Court’s view of the significance of § 273’s enactment, see Bilski v. Kap-
pos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228–29 (2010).  
 41. See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 233 (2002) (“The appli-
cation of the Takings Clause to intellectual property . . . has not yet been seriously tested in the 
courts.”).  But see Adam Mossoff, Patents As Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection 
of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 691 (2007) (arguing that “long-forgotten 
nineteenth-century jurisprudence in the Supreme Court and in lower federal courts . . . show[s] that 
jurists once enthusiastically held that patents were protected under the Takings Clause”). 
 42. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 41, at 239 (“If the government were to transfer title in a 
patent to itself, or if it were to destroy an intellectual property right (as allegedly occurred with respect 
to the trade secret information in [Ruckelshaus v.] Monsanto[, 467 U.S. 986 (1984)], then there is no 
doubt this would constitute a taking.”); see also Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003–04 (“We therefore hold 
that to the extent that Monsanto has an interest in its health, safety, and environmental data cogniza-
ble as a trade-secret property right under Missouri law, that property right is protected by the Taking 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”); id. at 1012 (“This Court has stated that a sovereign, ‘by ipse dixit, 
may not transform private property into public property without compensation . . . . This is the very 
kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent.’”) (quoting 
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)); James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 
356, 357–58 (1881) (“That the government of the United States when it grants letters-patent for a new 
invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented in-
vention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without just compensation, 
any more than it can appropriate or use without compensation land which has been patented to a pri-
vate purchaser, we have no doubt.”). 
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courts have held governmental elimination of the right to exclude,43 or 
governmental elimination of all economically beneficial use of the prop-
erty,44 to be a taking per se.  Indeed, the Supreme Court, in a recent deci-
sion summarizing decades of takings cases, described the “classic taking” 
as one “in which government directly appropriates private property or 
ousts the owner from his domain.”45  On the other hand, IP rights are 
personalty,46 not realty, and even quite severe curtailments of rights in 
personalty have withstood takings challenges.47  The courts may thus 
choose to scrutinize legislative curtailment—even outright elimination—
of a class of IP rights under the ad hoc balancing test from Penn Central.48  
That 1978 decision established the prevailing standard for evaluating the 
claim that a regulation goes so far in readjusting the benefits and burdens 
of ownership that it amounts to a compensable taking.49  The outcome of 
ad hoc balancing is, of course, difficult to predict.50  A legislature that 
wants to fix a wrongly broadened IP statute may be turned from its goal 
by the strictures of the Fifth Amendment—about which more in a mo-
ment.  Alternatively, if the legislature forges ahead to extinguish the im-
providently created rights and to compensate the rights holders, thus 
avoiding the takings problem, it has unquestionably undertaken a more 
costly venture than legislative correction of the corresponding false nega-
tive. 
The practical obstacle to correcting a false positive legislatively is 
rooted in an interest-group story.51  When a court decision establishes, 
incorrectly, an IP entitlement, the false positive calls into being a focused 
 
 43. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (imposition 
of a cable TV wiring easement on a private apartment building); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (imposition of a navigational easement on a private bay). 
 44. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (imposition of a building ban 
on beachfront land). 
 45. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005); see also Brown v. Legal Found. of 
Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003) (using “a per se approach,” rather than Penn Central balancing, be-
cause “the transfer of the interest [earned in lawyer IOLTA accounts] to the Foundation here seems 
more akin to the occupation of a small amount of rooftop space [struck down] in Loretto”). 
 46. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 261. 
 47. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28 (“[I]n the case of personal property, by reason of the State’s 
traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings, [an owner] ought to be aware of the 
possibility that new regulation might even render his property economically worthless (at least if the 
property’s only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale).”); Andrus v. Allard, 444 
U.S. 51, 65–67 (1979) (concluding that imposition of a ban on eagle feather sales does not effect a tak-
ing). 
 48. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N. Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–26 (1978). 
 49. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (“The Penn Central factors—though each has given rise to vexing 
subsidiary questions—have served as the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims 
that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules.”).  “Under this test, the Court balances (1) 
the economic impact of the regulation and (2) its interference with the owner’s reasonable investment-
backed expectations against (3) the nature of the government’s action.”  Daniel A. Lyons, Virtual Tak-
ings: The Coming Fifth Amendment Challenge to Net Neutrality Regulation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
65, 90 (2011). 
 50. See David Crump, Takings by Regulation: How Should Courts Weigh the Balancing Factors?, 
52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 2–5 (2012); see also Lyons, supra note 49, at 90 (observing that Penn Cen-
tral balancing “offers maddeningly little predictability or consistency across cases”). 
 51. See generally Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial 
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991). 
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interest group for resisting any subsequent legislative correction.  In oth-
er words, the judicial decision ratifying the claim that the IP statute in 
question creates a right also spotlights new rights holders, who thereafter 
form an incumbent group.  Relative to the general public, which might 
want to correct the false positive, these rights holders—who stand to lose 
most directly from a legislative correction to the statute—constitute a 
smaller, more easily organized group.  As a result, the newly anointed 
rights holders are likely to be more effective at influencing the legislative 
process than those who might seek to correct the statute.52  This is espe-
cially so where, as here, the interest group need only stop legislation, i.e., 
protect the new status quo by vetoing change, to prevent error correc-
tion.  Traditional U.S. bicameralism-and-presentment lawmaking, at the 
state and national levels, has many veto points for our imagined rights 
holders to exploit.53  Of course, with a statute about a different sort of 
right, considering the cost of error correction might point one away from, 
rather than toward, favoring false negatives.  For example, with a small 
claim under a vague consumer-protection statute, one might conclude 
that a false positive (in favor of the consumer’s claim) is easier to correct, 
inasmuch as the defendant producers in the relevant sector may well be 
far fewer in number and far better organized for repeat play to pursue 
legislative correction.54  With IP statutes, however, courts should avoid 
property-generating false positives. 
One powerful argument that the new group of judicially ratified 
rights holders will have at their disposal to better oppose legislative 
amendment is an informal version of the formal legal argument de-
scribed above—namely, that the sought-for abrogation of the newly iden-
tified right is an unconstitutional taking unless it is accompanied by com-
pensation.  “People care about property—a lot.”55  As a result, an anti-
correction interest group can wield this property-based rhetoric to great 
effect, even if the ultimate legal fate of a formal takings claim would be 
uncertain.56  In the middle inning of the famed Sony v. Universal home-
 
 52. The power of an incumbent group is significant even where the status quo does not include a 
property-right grant, and thus the change merely exposes incumbents to new entrants or to more flexi-
ble (rather than frozen) rate-setting mechanisms.  See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability 
Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1296 
(1996) (highlighting this contrast between statutory licenses and privately organized licensing bodies); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275 (2000) (discussing tran-
sitions from command-and-control to market-based environmental regulation).  With the formal and 
practical power of a property claim in their favor, however, the newly created anti-correction incum-
bents hold a uniquely commanding position indeed. 
 53. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 
887, 918–19 (2012) (discussing the structural asymmetry); Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administra-
tive Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1322–23 (2012) (describing obstacles created by con-
gressional structure and internal procedure). 
 54. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 478 (discussing this type of regulatory scenario). 
 55. David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 652 
(2010). 
 56. See Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
873, 895–903 (1997) (exploring the rhetorical power of “property” talk in the IP context); Pamela 
Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in 
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taping case, about which I offer more thoughts below,57 the plaintiff stu-
dios wielded this very rhetorical cudgel about takings.58  Although de-
fendant equipment maker Sony won at trial, the copyright plaintiffs won 
in the Ninth Circuit, which held in October 1981 that the VCR seller was 
contributorily liable for the copyright infringement of end-users who 
were taping broadcast television programs at home.59  The initial legisla-
tive response was swift: “The following day, members of Congress intro-
duced legislation in both the House and the Senate to legalize home vid-
eo recording.”60  At a “special hearing in Los Angeles” in April 1982 to 
consider multiple bills that would have abrogated the Ninth Circuit’s 
broad construction of the Copyright Act in favor of copyright owners, 
[t]he motion picture industry’s chief lobbyist, Jack Valenti, was the 
first witness.  He appeared armed with a 49 page legal memoran-
dum authored by Harvard law professor Larry Tribe, which argued 
that any law that exempted home videotaping from liability for 
copyright infringement would be an unconstitutional taking of pri-
vate property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.61 
The legislation was overtaken by subsequent events in the case: “On 
June 14, 1982, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Sony case, and 
members of Congress sat back to wait and see what the Court would 
do.”62  After the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
and absolved Sony of copyright infringement liability, the draft liability-
exemption bills opposed on takings grounds were moot.  Congress has 
never amended the Copyright Act to overturn Sony.63 
 
Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 395–99 (1989) (same).  This far greater formal 
and rhetorical power of a property-based claim is the reason why the error-cost analysis does not, in 
my view, simply reduce to a preference for the claimant with lower estimated post-adjudication lobby-
ing power. 
 57. See infra notes 113–25 and accompanying text. 
 58. Professor Litman covers all facets of the Sony case in her comprehensive account.  Jessica 
Litman, The Story of Sony v. Universal Studios: Mary Poppins Meets the Boston Strangler, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 358 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).  
 59. Id. at 362–64. 
 60. Id. at 365. 
 61. Id.  The Tribe Memo is reprinted in a set of materials from the Senate Judiciary Committee 
hearings on the same topic.  See Laurence H. Tribe, Memorandum of Constitutional Law on Copyright 
Compensation Issues Raised by the Proposed Congressional Reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s Betamax 
Ruling (Dec. 5, 1981), reprinted in Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearings on 
S. 1758 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 78–128 (1982).  Professor Tribe argued that, 
on one hand, “the pending bills take from the copyright owners the very essence of their property: the 
exclusive right to control who may copy their work and profit from its reproduction”; while, on the 
other hand, “none of the contemplated bills take the next step—a step this memorandum argues that 
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution requires—because none of the bills ensures compensation to 
the owners of existing copyrights for the valuable property that the bills take away.”  Id. at 81 (page 2 
of the typescript memo).  The important question here is not whether Tribe was right, but rather 
whether this type of argument is strong enough to help slow or stop legislative correction of a judicial 
false positive.  At least in 1982, paid lobbyists thought the answer to this latter question was “yes,” at 
least to a confidence level that justified obtaining a written opinion on the matter from a recognized 
leader in the field from one of the nation’s most distinguished law faculties. 
 62. Litman, supra note 58, at 366. 
 63. According to Prof. Litman’s account, “[t]he motion picture industry vowed to overturn the 
decision in Congress, but found little enthusiasm in the Senate and House for imposing a copyright tax 
on videocassette recorders or blank tapes.”  Id. at 383. 
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B. Harmless Error or Policy Delegation? 
To recap, the design goal is to minimize the sum of the statutory 
construction decision’s administrative costs and error costs.  Assume a 
conventional approach to statutory construction, which fixes the adminis-
trative-cost term.  Assume, also, that the court is in genuine doubt as to 
which plausible answer about statutory scope is right.  If false positives 
and false negatives are equally likely, and false positives have higher cor-
rection costs than false negatives, the court minimizes the sum of the 
costs by preferring false negatives to false positives, i.e., by rejecting the 
claim to an IP entitlement.  Correct denial needs no legislative amend-
ment, and incorrect denial is less costly to correct.  In other words, when 
in doubt about the IP statute’s scope, a court should adopt the property-
right-denying construction. 
“But wait,” one might object, “in the IP context, false positives 
merely generate harmless extra property rights, whereas false negatives 
harmfully reduce the incentive to innovate.”  The flaw in this harmless-
error objection is that it reflects but one strand in a vigorous, ongoing 
debate about the circumstances in which the IP strategy—conferring an 
exclusion right on a private party to encourage parties to invest in gener-
ating new information64—is a net benefit for innovation.  The debate runs 
the gamut from enthusiastic propertization65 to IP abolitionism,66 hitting 
many points in between.67  It has, in its contemporary form alone, gener-
ated a sprawling literature, which there is no need to canvass here.  
Three facets of the larger policy terrain are germane to the error-cost 
approach to construing IP statutes of doubtful scope.  First, for products 
of the mind, free and fair competition—not state-conferred exclusion 
rights—is the default rule for our economy: “In general, unless an intel-
lectual property right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it 
will be subject to copying.”68  Second, within the IP-strategy frame, the 
 
 64. See Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property 
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 974–75 (2012) (describing the basic IP strategy).  For a more gen-
eral description, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2062–63 
(2012) (describing “property [a]s a distinctive strategy for determining how resources will be used and 
by whom,” in which “[s]pecific resources are assigned to designated persons who have unique preroga-
tives in dealing with the resource relative to all other persons in the relevant normative community”). 
 65. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal 
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 521 (2010).   
 66. See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 7 
(2008). Boldrin and Levine carve out trademark, training their fire on patent and copyright.  Id.  By 
contrast, in this paper, I do not differentiate among patent, copyright, trademark, or trade secret law. 
 67. Perhaps the most amusing point, suspended in a sort of policy midair, is the conclusion that 
economist Fritz Machlup reached, as to patent law, in his 1958 report to Congress: 
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present 
knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a 
patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to 
recommend abolishing it. 
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
80 (Comm. Print 1958) (Fritz Machlup). 
 68. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001); see also Int’l News Serv. 
v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The general rule of law is, that 
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merits of commons-enclosing propertization over free competition are 
deeply situation-specific.69  Legislatures can reasonably strike a different 
balance between property and free use for different times and places.70  
Third, the IP strategy is not the only tool policy makers can use to foster 
scientific and cultural production; legislatures can also create grants for 
basic research, sponsor goal-defined prizes, and rely on commons-based 
production.71  A legislature is surely entitled to conclude, in view of these 
predicates, that a court’s false positive for a given statute would harm a 
given legislative policy project as much as, or more than, would a false 
negative.  Correspondingly, for its part, a court cannot simply assume 
that, in any given IP case of uncertain statutory scope, the legislature 
would deem an erroneous broadening of the entitlement to be harmless 
and an erroneous narrowing of the entitlement to be harmful.  The Su-
preme Court, in any event, certainly does not make that assumption.72 
 
the noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, 
after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995) (“The freedom to engage in business and to compete for the 
patronage of prospective customers is a fundamental premise of the free enterprise system.”); id. § 38 
cmt. b (“[T]he law has long recognized the right of a competitor to copy the successful product and 
business methods of others absent protection under patent, copyright, or trademark law.”); WILLIAM 
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
23 (2003) (“If someone has the bright idea that a particular intersection is a good location for a gas 
station, and builds one at one corner of the intersection, he cannot prevent someone else from appro-
priating his idea by building a gas station at the opposite corner.  A fundamental principle of Ameri-
can law is that competition is not a tort, that is, an invasion of a legally protected right.  Freedom to 
imitate, to copy, is a cornerstone of competition and operates to minimize monopoly profits.”). 
 69. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1060 
(2005) (“While there is substantial debate about how best to promote innovation—through the control 
of monopoly or the spur of competition—there is substantial evidence that, at least in some industries, 
competition is a stronger spur to innovation.”) (footnote omitted); see also BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, 
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 275–305 (2012); Brett M. Frisch-
mann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 277 (2007); Mark A. Lemley & Law-
rence Lessig, The End of End-To-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband 
Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 960–61 (2001); Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentral-
ized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 123, 125–26 (2006). 
 70. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(i) (2006) (exempting comparative advertising from 
trademark dilution liability); 17 U.S.C. § 109 (exempting a consumer’s resale activity from a copyright 
owner’s distribution right, while at the same time fencing off phonorecord and software rentals from 
the benefit of the exemption); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (exempting specified research uses from patent 
infringement liability). 
 71. See Kapczynski, supra note 64 (exploring these alternative mechanisms). 
 72. See supra note 5; see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for 
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.  For these firms, an 
injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a bar-
gaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.  
When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to produce 
and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages 
may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public 
interest.  In addition injunctive relief may have different consequences for the burgeoning number of 
patents over business methods, which were not of much economic and legal significance in earlier 
times.”) (citations omitted). 
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An “intersystemic adjudication”73 variant on the harmless-error ob-
jection also appears flawed, albeit for a different reason.  Federal courts 
can decide questions of state IP law, including unsettled questions, on 
grounds of either diversity or supplemental jurisdiction.74  State courts 
can decide unsettled questions of federal trademark law under concur-
rent jurisdiction75 and unsettled questions of a sister state’s IP law under 
choice-of-law principles.  As a result, both federal and state courts can 
find themselves construing an IP statute of doubtful scope, knowing—at 
the same time—that they are not the last judicial word on the scope of 
that statute. 
In a diversity or supplemental jurisdiction case, a federal court must 
predict, as best it can, how the relevant state supreme court would con-
strue the statute in question.76  But the state supreme court is not bound 
by that federal determination.77  Similarly, a state-court construction of 
federal law is subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United 
States but is not binding on any federal court, and a sister state supreme 
court is not bound by another state’s construction of its statutes or of 
federal statutes.  A court in such a situation, whether state or federal, 
may conclude—if it considers the matter at all—that it need not be as 
concerned about an erroneous construction of a different system’s IP 
statute as it would be with a statute of its own.  After all, no one is (seri-
ously) bound by the adjudicating court’s construction.  But an intersys-
temic-adjudication error is costly to correct.  Consider, for example, a 
federal court that has wrongly broadened a state trade-secret statute.  
Parties in a position to benefit from the decision, with a newly expanded 
sort-of-right, can use the federal decision as leverage in future dealings 
with others and as persuasive authority in other courts.  Should anyone 
seek to amend the state statute to rule out the construction adopted in 
the federal case, i.e., to remove that leverage, however, the same parties 
can oppose the amendment by asserting to state legislators that the fed-
eral decision does not actually bind anyone.  There is, in other words, 
 
 73. See Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2005) (defining “intersystemic adjudication” as “the interpretation 
by a court operating within one political system of laws of another political system”). 
 74. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental). 
 75. Federal court jurisdiction of patent law and copyright law matters is exclusive of the states, 
but concurrent as to federal trademark law.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a); see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene 
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 275 (1997) (“For purposes of the Supremacy Clause, it is simply irrelevant wheth-
er the claim is brought in state or federal court. Federal courts, after all, did not have general federal-
question jurisdiction until 1875.  Assuming the availability of a state forum with the authority and pro-
cedures adequate for the effective vindication of federal law, due process concerns would not be impli-
cated by having state tribunals resolve federal-question cases.”); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 
(1990) (“[U]nder our federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal 
Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause. Under this system of dual 
sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presump-
tively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States.”). 
 76. Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967); King v. Order of United Commercial 
Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 161 (1948). 
 77. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gooseneck Trailer Mfg. v. Barker, 619 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1981) (rejecting federal court decisions in diversity cases on question of Missouri state law). 
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nothing (really) to correct.  A wrongly narrowed statute creates a similar-
ly muddled picture, giving beneficiaries a sort-of-privilege and propo-
nents of correction a spectral quasi-error that vanishes when targeted.  
The errors are symmetric, and correcting them takes effort: a legislature 
must first be persuaded that the error is harmful, then moved to remedy 
that harm.  These errors are not harmless. 
“But wait,” another might object, “the statute’s fuzzy boundary is a 
delegation, from legislatures to courts, to fill the gap with what the courts 
deem to be the best substantive answer.  Courts should not dodge that 
delegation with a detour into legislative correction and error-cost reason-
ing.”  As a conceptual matter, if one were writing on a clean slate, the 
contention would be plausible.  Even if IP statutes are more fulsome 
than the paradigm of the common-law delegation from legislature to 
courts, i.e., the Sherman Act in antitrust,78 commentators widely recog-
nize that IP statutes often leave the courts with significant policy flexibil-
ity in tailoring the legislative directives to particular circumstances.79  To 
take only the most obvious examples: the Patent Act’s damages floor is a 
“reasonable royalty,”80 and its fee-shifting provision applies “in excep-
tional cases.”81  The Copyright Act’s fair use defense comprises an open-
ended four-factor framework.82  The Trademark Act prohibits use of a 
mark that is “likely to cause confusion . . . as to the origin” of one’s 
goods, without defining confusion or providing a test to detect it.83  The 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act requires, as a condition of protectability, that 
the information in question be “the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”84  The courts muddle 
through with these delegations, just as they should.  But, importantly, the 
delegation slate isn’t clean.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly empha-
sized that IP law requires a careful policy balance to be struck between 
free competition (the rule) and exclusion rights (the exception), and that 
Congress is to play the primary policymaking role on these matters.85  
 
 78. See Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are “Common-
Law Statutes” Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyam Balganesh 
ed., forthcoming 2013). 
 79. Id. 
 80. 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
 81. Id. § 285. 
 82. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 83. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
 84. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (1985). 
 85. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (“We have also stressed . . . that it is generally 
for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.”); Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“As the text of the Constitution makes 
plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that 
should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their 
work product.”); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530–31 (1972) (“The direc-
tion of Art. I is that Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can 
come only from Congress. . . . [W]e should not expand patent rights by overruling or modifying our 
prior cases construing the patent statutes, unless the argument for expansion of privilege is based on 
more than mere inference from ambiguous statutory language. We would require a clear and certain 
signal from Congress before approving the position of a litigant who, as respondent here, argues that 
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The Court has consistently emphasized IP’s careful, congressionally de-
termined balance across copyright,86 patent,87 and trademark88 cases.  It 
does not seem prudent, at this late date, to presume that courts will cease 
looking principally to legislatures to make the key tradeoffs between 
competition and exclusion (including by amending IP statutes to take ac-
count of new developments). 
C. Clear Statements and Candor 
Two points remain before discussing Supreme Court decisions that 
comport, if only faintly, with my decision-theoretic approach.  One re-
lates to the judicial tradition of using clear statement rules in statutory 
construction cases.  The other relates to the role of judicial candor in my 
framework. 
As to clear statement rules: The focus of my error-cost approach is, 
as I have emphasized, the case where a court is in genuine doubt about 
the scope of a statutory IP right.  An appreciation for the asymmetric 
costs of legislative error correction points to a judicial preference for 
false negatives over false positives in aid of legislative correction.  The 
focus on cases of doubt may also call to mind—and one could seek to re-
cast my approach as—a clear statement rule (or substantive policy can-
on) in favor of free competition over exclusion rights.  As Hart and Sacks 
described the judicial policy-canon technique, “[j]udicial opinions on the 
interpretation of statutes are replete with references to presumptions, or 
suggestions of the existence of presumptions, amounting to what are here 
called policies of clear statement.  In effect, these presumptions all say to 
the legislature, ‘if you mean this, you must say so plainly.’”89 
 
the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of public use narrower, than courts had previously 
thought.”); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Within the limits of the constitutional 
grant [in Article I, section 8, clause 8], the Congress may, of course, implement the stated purpose of 
the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim.”). 
 86. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) (“Absent an explicit statement of congressional 
intent that the rights in the renewal term of an owner of a pre-existing work are extinguished upon 
incorporation of his work into another work, it is not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress 
has labored to achieve.”); Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (“Because this task involves a difficult balance be-
tween the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and dis-
coveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and 
commerce on the other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly.”). 
 87. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (“From their incep-
tion, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote innovation 
and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention 
itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.”). 
 88. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003) (“The rights of 
a patentee or copyright holder are part of a ‘carefully crafted bargain’ under which, once the patent or 
copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and without attribu-
tion. Thus, in construing the Lanham Act, we have been ‘careful to caution against misuse or over-
extension’ of trademark and related protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent or copy-
right.”) (citation omitted) (quoting Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150, and TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. 
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)). 
 89. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1209; see also id. at 1376 ( “[P]olicies of clear statement . . . 
have been judicially developed to promote objectives of the legal system which transcend the wishes of 
any particular session of the legislature.”).  The leading sources in the contemporary literature on stat-
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In the IP domain, the “this” would be the creation of a right to ex-
clude.  In my view, however, a clear-statement-rule approach confuses 
more than it clarifies.  Specifically, a judicial clear statement rule ob-
scures the legislative center of gravity of the error-correction-cost asym-
metry that I have highlighted.  By obscuring the asymmetry, which points 
to legislative correction, the rule suggests that it is the judiciary—rather 
than the legislature—that is taking the policy lead as to the IP right’s 
scope.  Whatever merit the appearance, or the reality, of a court-centric 
clear statement rule may have in other contexts, it does not seem as like-
ly to foster interbranch dialogue as does a rationale centered on the rela-
tive ease of legislative correction.  And that dialogue is key for IP, a mat-
ter of social policy in which the only constant is technological change.  
Legislatures need the case-driven insights that courts can provide on the 
success with which existing IP statutes are adapted to people’s current 
needs and technological challenges. 
Which brings me to judicial candor.  I concede, as I think any realist 
must, that “[t]o choose candor in situations of uncertainty is not, despite 
the surface appeal, inevitable.”90  In so conceding, I do not mean to take 
anything away from the vital principle that “[c]andor is an essential com-
ponent of a judicial opinion.”91  Inevitable or not, judicial candor about 
the foregoing error-cost approach is my hope.  The reason, again, is to 
better inform any subsequent legislative debate about ways to better 
tether an IP statute to our best current understanding of the state of the 
world. 
If courts openly use this error-cost approach to resolve questions of 
doubt about the scope of statutory IP rights, some of that benefit will be 
realized.  Courts, unlike legislatures, confront a steady diet of richly de-
tailed, particularized disputes.  Judges must therefore grapple with the 
ways that generally phrased legislative directives map, better or worse, 
onto messy facts.92  And parties are likelier to require court resolution 
when the statute maps poorly onto those facts, leaving room for both 
parties to muster strong arguments on their behalf about the statute’s 
scope.93  A court can, of course, draft an opinion for the case in a way 
that downplays the merits of the losing side’s arguments, lending the 
 
utory construction are William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992), and Sunstein, supra note 
8.  For an up-to-date review of the many clear statement rules the courts have formulated, the inter-
ested reader should consult Appendix B of WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 29–41 (4th ed. 
2007). 
 90. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 178 (1982). 
 91. Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 293 
(2008). 
 92. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 439 (“[T]he focus on the particular circumstances enables judg-
es to deal with applications that no legislature, no matter how farsighted, could conceivably have fore-
seen.”). 
 93. See SCHAUER, supra note 9, at 22. 
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winner an air of inevitability.94  “Judicial opinions are notoriously—even 
comically—unequivocal.”95  Indeed, a court can draft an opinion of this 
sort even when, privately, it has decided the case on the error-cost 
grounds I have described (opting for the narrower construction of the 
statute, which—if incorrect—will at least be a false negative).  But should 
it? I think not. 
Such an opinion, with its façade of absolute certainty, is a missed 
opportunity.  If the court has developed a deep, practical sense for the 
statute’s problematic boundary, it should share that hard-won infor-
mation about statute-to-fact fit with both the parties and the general pub-
lic.  The direct way to do so is an opinion that engages openly with the 
problem’s full complexity.  Professor Kahan, drawing on the philosophi-
cal tradition of aporia (), has called this approach to opinion writ-
ing “aporetic engagement,” the distinctive feature of which is “acknowl-
edgment of complexity”: “it necessarily treats as false—a sign of 
misunderstanding—any resolution of the problem that purports to be 
unproblematic.”96  This candid acknowledgment of complexity better 
serves the public, in both the short and the long run.  In particular, a 
court moved to avoid the larger error-correction cost should state that as 
well, properly pointing to the legislature as the center of policy gravity on 
the issue.  The losing party can then join with others, similarly interested, 
to take the policy question to that legislature, with the clarity of the judi-
cial opinion in hand as an aid to explanation and understanding.97  The 
winning party, and others similarly interested, can join the discussion as 
well. 
How much new ground, in practice, would a court need to break to 
resolve doubtful cases about a statutory IP right’s scope in the way, and 
with the candor, that I have described?  The next two sections take up 
this question. 
  
 
 94. A vivid recent example is Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (construing broadly the defense in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).  Both the majority and dis-
senting opinions adopt an all-too-familiar judicial pose that no person could reasonably disagree with 
the opinion’s analysis.  Neither opinion seems to recognize that the alternative opinion’s very exist-
ence puts the lie to that pose.  
 95. Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for 
Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59 (2011); see also Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results 
and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1417 (1995) (lamenting that 
“judges still typically write as if they were absolutely certain about the rightness and soundness of their 
analysis and decisions,” even though “everyone (including the judges) knows that’s not necessarily the 
case”). 
 96. Kahan, supra note 95, at 62.  Aporia is not a matter of a given judge’s personal limitations, 
but rather “emphasizes the limited amenability of the problem to a satisfactory solution, along with 
apprehension of the same.”  Id. at 62 n.347. 
 97. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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III. ERROR COSTS IN IP CASES 
The Supreme Court’s IP cases, in contrast to those in antitrust, do 
not currently feature robust discussion of the different error-correction 
costs associated with different doctrinal choices.  Some IP cases do, how-
ever, show faint threads of the approach.  It is enough to build on, should 
courts choose to do so.  There are three decisions that are worthy of spe-
cial note.  Justice Stevens authored all of them.98  And his IP decisions, as 
a group, show a pattern that comports with the error-cost approach that 
favors false negatives over false positives.  As Professor Samuelson has 
described, “[w]hen Congress has not clearly expressed its intent to ex-
tend protection as far as a plaintiff would like, Justice Stevens tends to 
construe the monopoly right narrowly because of the impacts that broad 
rulings will have on competition, commerce, and public access to 
knowledge.”99 
The first pair of cases pertains to the Court’s forty-year struggle100 to 
define the contours of patentable subject matter under § 101 of the Pa-
tent Act.101  The term “process” in § 101 has proved especially vexing, 
primarily in the area of computer-implemented processes.  This is be-
cause the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the categories in § 101, 
although broad, have limits: “‘Excluded from such patent protection are 
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.’  A process, 
claimed separately from the device or materials used to practice it, is al-
ready more abstract than a claim to a product.  But is it too abstract?”102 
In Parker v. Flook,103 the Court considered whether a process for 
updating a catalytic-conversion alarm limit, which relied on a new math-
ematical algorithm, was a patentable “process” for purposes of § 101.104  
The Court answered “no,” reasoning from its then-recent decision in the 
Benson case (also rejecting a claim to a computer-based data conversion 
process), as well as patentable-subject-matter decisions spanning the 
mid-19th to the early 20th centuries.105  In the closing portion of the opin-
ion, Justice Stevens noted both that “[t]o a large extent our conclusion is 
based on reasoning derived from opinions written before the modern 
business of developing programs for computers was conceived,” and that 
“[d]ifficult questions of policy concerning the kinds of programs that may 
be appropriate for patent protection and the form and duration of such 
 
 98. Indeed, “[n]o Justice in the past thirty years [1975-2005] has come close to writing as many 
opinions in IP cases as Justice Stevens.” Samuelson, supra note 17, at 1835. 
 99. Id. at 1840. 
 100. The modern line begins with Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), and ends, most re-
cently, with Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 101. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
 102. Joseph Scott Miller, Bilski v. Kappos: Everything Old is New Again, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2011) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). 
 103. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 104. Id. at 585–86. 
 105. Id. at 588–92. 
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protection can be answered by Congress on the basis of current empirical 
data not equally available to this tribunal.”106  He went further, however, 
to highlight the difficulty of striking out too far ahead of Congress’ di-
rective: “It is our duty to construe the patent statutes as they now read, in 
light of our prior precedents, and we must proceed cautiously when we 
are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Con-
gress.”107  When the factual context goes far beyond what the enacting 
Congress considered, the risk of judicial error is greater, and caution is 
advised when a claimant seeks a more expansive view of a statutory IP 
right.  To be sure, this is not an explicit recognition of, much less en-
gagement with, an error-cost approach.  It does suggest, however, an 
awareness that judicial error about a legislative directive is a possibility 
to actively take into account. 
The second case in this pair is Bilski v. Kappos,108 Justice Stevens’ 
last IP case on the Court.109  The Court unanimously rejected patent 
claims to a risk-hedging method, concluding that the claims did not recite 
any patentable “process” under § 101.  But the Court divided, five to 
four, in its rationale.  Justice Kennedy, for the majority, simply analo-
gized to the decisions in Benson and Flook, declaring that “[t]he concept 
of hedging, described in claim 1 and reduced to a mathematical formula 
in claim 4 [of Bilski’s patent application], is an unpatentable abstract 
idea . . . .”110  Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, took a categor-
ical approach, concluding that “a claim that merely describes a method of 
doing business does not qualify as a ‘process’ under § 101.”111  Justice 
Stevens explained his approach with an exhaustive review of many 
sources, in an opinion three times as long (twenty-seven pages in West’s 
Supreme Court Reporter) as the majority’s (nine pages).  The most im-
portant passage here, however, is brief.  Summing up a detailed assess-
ment of both English antecedents and long U.S. practice, Justice Stevens 
both invoked the caution commended in Flook and explicitly linked the 
risk of judicial error to the legislative difficulty of correcting a false posi-
tive as to a statutory IP entitlement’s scope: 
Since at least the days of Assyrian merchants, people have de-
vised better and better ways to conduct business.  Yet it appears 
that neither the Patent Clause, nor early patent law, nor the current 
§ 101 contemplated or was publicly understood to mean that such 
innovations are patentable.  Although it may be difficult to define 
with precision what is a patentable “process” under § 101, the his-
torical clues converge on one conclusion: A business method is not 
a “process.”  And to the extent that there is ambiguity, we should be 
 
 106. Id. at 595. 
 107. Id. at 596 (emphasis added). 
 108. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 109. The Court issued its Bilski decision on June 28, 2010, id., and Justice Stevens retired on June 
29, 2010.  John Paul Stevens, supra note 16. 
 110. 130 S. Ct. at 3231. 
 111. Id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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mindful of our judicial role.  “[W]e must proceed cautiously when 
we are asked to extend patent rights” into an area that the Patent 
Act likely was not “enacted to protect,” lest we create a legal regime 
that Congress never would have endorsed, and that can be repaired 
only by disturbing settled property rights.112 
The methodological link to decision theory, although tacit, is unmis-
takable.  When a legislative directive is ambiguous, and thus the risk of 
judicial error about the scope of the statutory IP right is heightened, the 
“judicial role” is to practice caution against an expansive reading of the 
statute.  This caution is required because it avoids an error “that can be 
repaired only by disturbing settled property rights.”  Justice Stevens, in 
Bilski, recognized both the need to consider legislative error correction 
and the asymmetric stakes when fixing a property-conferring false posi-
tive about a statutory IP right.  In doing so, he put the cautious approach 
of Flook on stronger ground—not caution as an amorphous passive vir-
tue, but as an institution-based reflection of error-correction costs. 
The third case in which the Court endorsed caution is Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.113  There, again, the Court con-
fronted a factual context that went far beyond what Congress had con-
sidered and thus faced a greater risk of judicial error.  Decided six years 
after Flook, the Sony case turned on a copyright claim.  Specifically, 
Universal and other copyright owners sued Sony for indirect copyright 
infringement.  They contended that because “some individuals had used 
Betamax video tape recorders (VTR’s) to record some of respondents’ 
copyrighted works,” thereby directly “infring[ing] [Universal’s] copy-
rights,” Sony was “liable for the copyright infringement allegedly com-
mitted by Betamax consumers because of [its] marketing of the Betamax 
VTR’s.”114  The case involved new technology, as well as novel questions 
about both (1) the scope of a copyright owner’s right to recover for indi-
rect infringement (a matter not expressly addressed by the Copyright 
Act),115 and (2) the scope of the fair use defense for copying that is both 
noncommercial and nontransformative.116  The complexities divided the 
Court five to four, and resolving the case took an unusual reargument in 
a second Court term.117 The Court ruled that Sony was not indirectly lia-
ble if its recorders were “widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable 
purposes,”118 and that home tapers were not liable for direct infringement 
because their unauthorized time shifting was fair use.119 
 
 112. Id. at 3249–50 (emphasis added) (parallel citation and internal citation omitted) (quoting 
Parker v. Flook 437 U.S. 593, 596 (1978)). 
 113. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 114. Id. at 420. 
 115. Id. at 434–35, 439–42 (discussing the indirect liability issue). 
 116. Id. at 447–55 (discussing the fair use issue).  
 117. See Litman, supra note 58, at 378–79. 
 118. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. “Indeed, [they] need merely [have] be[en] capable of substantial non-
infringing uses.” Id. 
 119. Id. at 455. 
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Just as important as these conclusions, however, is the framework 
Justice Stevens set out for applying an IP statute to new technologies.  
Before analyzing the specific issues in the case, he highlighted the central 
role of Congress in setting IP policy: “[I]t is Congress that has been as-
signed the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should 
be granted to authors or to inventors[,]” and 
[b]ecause this task involves a difficult balance between the interests 
of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their 
writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing 
interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the 
other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended 
repeatedly.120 
The policy primacy of Congress, the fact-specific tradeoffs that IP 
policy entails, and the constant of technological change all shape the pos-
ture the judiciary should take in construing IP statutes.  “Repeatedly, as 
new developments have occurred in this country, it has been the Con-
gress that has fashioned the new rules that new technology made neces-
sary.”121  Correspondingly, “[t]he judiciary’s reluctance to expand the 
protections afforded by the copyright [entitlement] without explicit legis-
lative guidance is a recurring theme.”122  The uncertainties produced 
when established statutory text meets new technology suggest caution in 
copyright, just as in patent: 
Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference 
to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market 
for copyrighted materials.  Congress has the constitutional authority 
and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permu-
tations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such 
new technology.123 
The heightened risk of judicial error calls for “circumspect[ion] in 
construing the scope of [the] rights . . . .”124  False negatives, in short, beat 
false positives. 
On its own terms, “Sony provides meaningful guidance about how 
copyright law should be construed when new technologies pose questions 
that the legislatures have not anticipated and [for which] case law does 
not readily provide clear answers.”125  When one considers Sony together 
with Flook and the concurrence in Bilski, however, that guidance moves 
beyond copyright laws to IP statutes more generally.  Moreover, after 
Bilski, the narrow take on statutory IP rights is expressly linked to the 
 
 120. Id. at 429. 
 121. Id. at 430–31. 
 122. Id. at 431. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Samuelson, supra note 17, at 1875–76; see also id. at 1849 (“For Justice Stevens, . . . [i]n the 
absence of a clear congressional direction about the legality of time shifting or other private [acts of] 
copying or about liability of technology developers for infringing acts of users, the Court should con-
strue the monopoly rights narrowly.”). 
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greater legislative difficulty of fixing judicial false positives—entailing, as 
it does, the “disturbing [of] settled property rights.”126   
Admittedly, this is still a step shy of an explicit decision-theoretic 
explanation for a given IP decision.  But it is a base on which courts can 
build.  As explained below, the Court’s antitrust case law illustrates the 
fruits such an effort could bear. 
IV. ERROR-COST LESSONS FROM ANTITRUST 
Antitrust case law has already logged decades of experience shaping 
doctrine with decision theory, starting in 1977 with “the dramatic infu-
sion of economic and error analysis initiated by the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.”127  Indeed, “the 
error-cost framework lies at the heart of modern economic and legal de-
bates surrounding antitrust analysis of business arrangements.”128 
“Judge Easterbrook is the intellectual originator of the application 
of the error-cost framework to antitrust rules,”129 and the locus classicus 
is his 1984 essay entitled The Limits of Antitrust.  The key passage is 
brief: 
If the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits 
may be lost for good.  Any other firm that uses the condemned 
practice faces sanctions in the name of stare decisis, no matter the 
benefits.  If the court errs by permitting a deleterious practice, 
though, the welfare loss decreases over time.  Monopoly is self-
destructive.  Monopoly prices eventually attract entry.130 
One can apply the insight that market forces can correct false nega-
tives to collusive arrangements as well, for cartels attract cheating much 
as monopoly attracts entry.131  The upshot of this asymmetry in error cor-
 
 126. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3250 (2010) (Steven, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 127. M. Laurence Popofsky, Does Leegin Liberate the Law Governing Horizontal Conspiracies 
from Its Vertical Contamination?, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 23, 23 (2012).  In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Court “overturned the (then short-lived) rule that most non-price 
vertical agreements were per se illegal and held that a selective distribution practice—location clauses 
in distributor agreements employed by a manufacturer with modest market share—was subject to the 
rule of reason.” Popofsky, supra, at 25 (footnote omitted). 
 128. Judd E. Stone & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Formalism Is Dead! Long Live Antitrust For-
malism! Some Implications of American Needle v. NFL, 2009–10 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 369, 383. 
 129. Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-Based 
Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 241, 251 (2012). 
 130. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984).  In short, “judi-
cial errors that tolerate baleful practices are self-correcting, while erroneous condemnations are not.” 
Id. at 3. As Professor McGowan has explained, 
Judge Easterbrook’s key point here is that judges do not fix bad precedents as surely and 
as quickly as markets fix (unlawful) market power. Bad precedent does not induce the entry of 
good precedent, which only judges can provide.  Judges are either unlikely to do so (because they 
like following precedent, which lowers the cost of thinking about new cases) or unable to do so 
(because they are bound by a superior tribunal or because as a panel they cannot reverse prece-
dent and have to try to invoke the en banc process). 
David McGowan, Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs and United States v. Microsoft Corp., 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1185, 1190 (2005). 
 131. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Information and Antitrust, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 1 (“Cartels 
have trouble with cheaters and fringe firms. Mergers, even mergers to monopoly, are undermined by 
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rection costs?  “In the absence of conclusive information on these rela-
tive costs, the error-cost framework counsels towards caution in con-
demning business practices through the antitrust laws.”132  False negatives 
are better than false positives, at a given level of administrative cost. 
The Supreme Court has fully integrated these insights into the way 
it analyzes questions about the scope of the antitrust laws.  The context 
for doing so is not the one I posit for statutory IP rights, i.e., doubt about 
a textual boundary.  The Sherman Act, which is far less detailed than the 
IP statutes, effectively delegates to the courts a common-law-like func-
tion.133 As a result, courts analyze administrative and error costs directly 
in the service of fashioning the basic structure of antitrust law’s prohibi-
tions on anticompetitive conduct.  A key theme in this process has been 
the difficulty of distinguishing lawful vigorous competition from unlawful 
competition-destructive activity.134 
For example, in a series of cases where the harmful conduct alleged 
was predatory pricing, the Court was wary of the difficulty of distinguish-
ing between below-cost pricing designed to remove a rival on the way to 
subsequent monopoly—which is unlawful—from aggressive price compe-
tition—which is not only perfectly lawful, but highly beneficial to con-
sumers.  In the first of these cases, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp.,135 the Supreme Court held “that allegations of a two-
decade long conspiracy on the part of Japanese electronics manufactur-
ers to charge predatorily low prices in the U.S. market was so implausible 
that summary judgment in favor of the defendants was proper.”136 Ana-
lyzing the quality of the evidence needed to raise a genuine issue of fact 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and thus resist summary 
judgment, the Court required antitrust plaintiffs to ground their com-
plaint in sound economic reasoning: “[I]f the factual context renders [the 
plaintiffs’] claim implausible—if the claim is one that simply makes no 
economic sense—[they] must come forward with more persuasive evi-
 
new entry that is prompted by higher prices.”); Lambert, supra note 14, at 890 (noting that “market 
power . . . is generally self-correcting by entry or, in the case of collusion, cheating”). 
 132. Wright, supra note 129, at 248; see also Lambert, supra note 14, at 890 (“False convictions are 
therefore more likely to cause greater and more durable harm than false acquittals and should thus be 
more stridently avoided by the governing liability rule.”). 
 133. As the Supreme Court recently explained, “[f]rom the beginning the Court has treated the 
Sherman Act as a common-law statute. Just as the common law adapts to modern understanding and 
greater experience, so too does the Sherman Act’s prohibition on ‘restraint[s] of trade’ evolve to meet 
the dynamics of present economic conditions.” Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 
U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (citations omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)). 
 134. Lambert, supra note 14, at 876–77 (“Challenges to concerted conduct are frequently perplex-
ing because a great many, perhaps most, output-enhancing business innovations involve cooperation 
among independent economic actors, frequently competitors. Challenges to unilateral conduct that 
may enhance market power are often hard to resolve because all actions that help a seller win business 
from its rivals—even pro-consumer actions like most price cuts—technically ‘exclude’ those rivals.  
Distinguishing output-reducing collusion from output-enhancing coordination (in section 1 cases) and 
unreasonable from reasonable exclusionary acts (in section 2 cases) can be exceedingly difficult.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 135. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 136. Diane P. Wood, Theory and Practice in Antitrust Law: Judge Cudahy’s Example, 29 YALE J. 
ON REG. 403, 411 n.51 (2012). 
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dence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary.”137 This 
was a tall order for Zenith’s alleged international predatory-pricing con-
spiracy, given the “consensus among commentators that predatory pric-
ing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.”138 The 
Court expressly grounded this greater scrutiny of the record evidence in 
the greater social cost of a false positive, concluding that 
courts should not permit factfinders to infer conspiracies when such 
inferences are implausible, because the effect of such practices is of-
ten to deter procompetitive conduct. Respondents, petitioners’ 
competitors, seek to hold petitioners liable for damages caused by 
the alleged conspiracy to cut prices. . . . But cutting prices in order 
to increase business often is the very essence of competition. Thus, 
mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, 
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed 
to protect.139 
To avert this more costly error, courts should use the summary judgment 
mechanism to weed out weak claims. 
Seven years later, the Court continued to treat predatory pricing 
claims with skepticism.  In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp.,140 the alleged misconduct was that of a single firm, not a 
group conspiracy.  Liggett claimed that Brown & Williamson used “dis-
criminatory volume rebates to wholesalers” to drive competition out of 
the market for generic cigarettes.141  After engaging in its own (uncharac-
teristically) lengthy exploration of the evidentiary record in the case, the 
Court held that Brown & Williamson was entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law.142  Following Matsushita, the Court laid out the requisites of a 
predatory pricing claim, explaining that these strictures necessarily fol-
low from the fact that “the costs of an erroneous finding of liability are 
high.”143 Again, the animating concern was to avoid the more socially 
costly false positive.  The difficulty that raises the likelihood of error is 
that anticompetitive predatory pricing and desirable price competition 
use the same basic mechanism, “lowering prices.”144  Additionally, the 
Court recently extended Brooke Group’s analysis of predatory pricing to 
 
 137. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 
 138. Id. at 589.  Indeed, the Court observed, the underlying “economic realities tend to make 
predatory pricing conspiracies self-deterring: unlike most other conduct that violates the antitrust laws, 
failed predatory pricing schemes are costly to the conspirators.  See Easterbrook, The Limits of Anti-
trust, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1, 26 (1984).” Id. at 595.  Note the early prominence of Easterbrook’s Limits 
essay, just two years after its publication. 
 139. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 593–94 (citations omitted). 
 140. 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
 141. Id. at 220. 
 142. Id. at 230–43. 
 143. Id. at 226. 
 144. Id. (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121 n.17 (1986)).  
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the context of predatory bidding, emphasizing the Court’s continuing in-
sistence on minimizing error costs.145 
Concern with the likelihood and cost of error is not isolated to cases 
about anticompetitive pricing.  Since 2004, the Court has twice consid-
ered the question whether an antitrust-based duty to deal supplements 
regulations originating in the telecommunications laws.  In the first of 
these cases, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, LLP,146 plaintiff Trinko brought a consumer class action on the 
ground that Verizon’s noncompliance with network sharing obligations 
to local telcos, mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, violat-
ed the antitrust laws.147 Rejecting the claim, the Court emphasized the 
downsides of blessing a wider antitrust-based duty to deal than had been 
established by its prior cases.148 Moreover, the upsides of antitrust appear 
paltry where a detailed regulatory scheme—in this case, telecommunica-
tions law—already targets harms to competition.149 Once error costs enter 
the calculus, the balance tips decisively against permitting a Sherman Act 
claim: 
Against the slight benefits of antitrust intervention here, we must 
weigh a realistic assessment of its costs. . . . Mistaken inferences and 
the resulting false condemnations “are especially costly, because 
they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to pro-
tect.” The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expan-
sion of § 2 liability. One false-positive risk is that an incumbent [lo-
cal telco]’s failure to provide a service with sufficient alacrity might 
have nothing to do with exclusion.  Allegations of violations of 
[1996 Telecommunications Act] duties are difficult for antitrust 
courts to evaluate, not only because they are highly technical, but 
also because they are likely to be extremely numerous, given the in-
cessant, complex, and constantly changing interaction of competi-
tive and incumbent [local telcos] implementing the sharing and in-
terconnection obligations.150 
The costs of false positives, given their likelihood, swamp any gains 
from adding a layer of antitrust enforcement to the competition-
protecting directives of the telecommunications laws. 
  
 
 145. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 315 (2007).  
“Both claims involve the deliberate use of unilateral pricing measures for anticompetitive purposes. 
And both claims logically require firms to incur short-term losses on the chance that they might reap 
supracompetitive profits in the future.”  Id. at 322 (footnote omitted). 
 146. 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 147. Id. at 401. 
 148. Id. at 407–08. 
 149. Id. at 412 (“Where such a structure exists, the additional benefit to competition provided by 
antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible that the antitrust laws contem-
plate such additional scrutiny.”). 
 150. Id. at 414 (citations omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 594 (1986)). 
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In the second of the two cases, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. 
Linkline Communications, Inc.,151 the telecomm duty came not from a 
statute, but from an FCC condition imposed on AT&T’s merger with 
Bell South.152  The plaintiff resellers of digital subscriber line (“DSL”) 
service, who bought AT&T’s DSL transport at wholesale, alleged that 
AT&T put the resellers in an anticompetitive “price squeeze” in an ef-
fort to monopolize the California DSL market.153 Error-cost analysis ul-
timately doomed the claim, which the Court viewed as nothing more 
than the failed union of a Trinko-foreclosed duty-to-deal claim and a fac-
tually baseless predatory-pricing claim of the sort rejected in Brooke 
Group.154  The Court summed up its analysis as follows: 
In this case, plaintiffs have not stated a duty-to-deal claim under 
Trinko and have not stated a predatory pricing claim under Brooke 
Group.  They have nonetheless tried to join . . . and alchemize them 
into a new form of antitrust liability never before recognized by this 
Court.  We decline the invitation to recognize such claims.  Two 
wrong claims do not make one that is right.155 
Matsushita’s error-cost analysis had anchored both Brooke Group and 
Trinko, and thus foreclosed the antitrust claim in Linkline. 
The error-cost “framework is widely recognized as an indispensable 
element of modern competition policy.”156  The Supreme Court has de-
ployed the framework to explain its reasoning about the basic shape of 
antitrust liability.  IP statutes, no less than antitrust doctrine, establish 
ground rules on the basis of which firms compete and innovate.157  It is 
odd, in a way, that the error-cost approach so common to antitrust has 
had so little effect on resolving close questions about the scope of statu-
tory IP rights.  The courts can change that, and they should.   
V. CONCLUSION 
IP statutes, like all statutes, have ambiguities that only case-by-case 
adjudication reveals.  When that ambiguity goes to the scope of the IP 
right, courts can err with underbreadth or with overbreadth.  Decision 
theory counsels that courts should minimize the sum of the error costs 
for any given level of administrative cost (here, the cost of the conven-
tional approach to construing statutes by means of text, context, purpose, 
 
 151. 555 U.S. 438 (2009). 
 152. Id. at 443. 
 153. Id. at 442–44; see also id. at 442 (“[A ‘price squeeze’ claim] can arise when a vertically inte-
grated firm sells inputs at wholesale and also sells finished goods or services at retail. If that firm has 
power in the wholesale market, it can simultaneously raise the wholesale price of inputs and cut the 
retail price of the finished good. This will have the effect of ‘squeezing’ the profit margins of any com-
petitors in the retail market. Those firms will have to pay more for the inputs they need; at the same 
time, they will have to cut their retail prices to match the other firm’s prices.”).  
 154. Id. at 449–51. 
 155.  Id. at 457. 
 156.  Wright, supra note 129, at 249. 
 157.  See generally Joseph Scott Miller, Patent Ships Sail an Antitrust Sea, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
395 (2007). 
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precedent, and consequence).  If false positives and false negatives are 
equally likely, and false positives have higher correction costs than false 
negatives, the court minimizes their sum by preferring false negatives to 
false positives, i.e., by rejecting the claim to an IP entitlement.  When in 
doubt about the statutory scope of an IP right, a court should thus adopt 
the property-right-denying construction.  And to better help the legisla-
ture and the public respond to the newly revealed ambiguity in the stat-
ute, the court should explain this basis for its reasoning. 
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